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ABSTRACT
Contemporary business entities that are keen to achieve measurable growth can no longer rely on inflexible corporate management frameworks for 
running their affairs. This viewpoint is adduced in the light of the emergence and re-emergence of unpredictable and likewise complex operating 
contexts. Notwithstanding the connected legal, financial, economic and social issues; business concerns must devise innovative ways to sustain holistic 
performance levels. Moreover, corporate and regulatory interests must collaborate to effectively mitigate corporate failures attributable to various 
business concerns. In furtherance of the debate on the nexus between corporate governance and human resource management, this paper presented a 
conceptual model that aggregates specific aspects of business processes that synergizes both concepts. Practical perspectives on the interrelatedness 
between corporate governance and human resource management provide a veritable basis to explore the theme of this paper. The paper opined that an 
appropriate balance must be achieved with regards to identifiable and fundamental aspects of the corporate structure and process. It was recommended 
that a diverse model of corporate integration enhances the functionalities of the corporate entity; facilitates optimization processes, thereby contributing 
to long term sustainability and growth. The central role of human actors in the governance of business entities is also duly emphasized, as this viewpoint 
underlies the essence of integrating the two concepts in general and specific terms.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Human Resource Management, Corporate Strategy 
JEL Classifications: M12, M21, M54
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern organizations operate in a relatively volatile business 
environment. Hence, the activities of various business organizations 
are affected by identifiable internal and external issues (Grant, 
1999). It has also been asserted in this regard, that organizations 
exist, co-exist, compete and cooperate in a dynamic environment 
characterized by complexities (Panagiotou, 2003). Therefore, 
it is important for corporate entities to adapt and integrate to 
sustain themselves in a constantly evolving environment (Morgan, 
1996; Fernando and Rogelio, 2005; Fabac, 2010). Organizations 
are inclined to adopt various strategies to gain a good degree 
of competitive advantage. This perspective is a component of 
the established principle that all corporate organizations are 
regulated by the laws of the market space and that such factors 
are a fundamental barometer of corporate performance (Monks 
and Minow, 2001; Osibanjo et al., 2014).
Organizations operating in such uncertain business contexts 
must constantly make an objective assessment of their internal 
processes. By adopting such a posture, these corporate entities can 
ensure that internal and external governance practices, as well as 
the connected human resource management outcomes are fully 
in alignment with the fundamental of ensuring the success of the 
organization (McIlquaham-Schmidt, 2010). A contrary approach 
may potentially manifest in lack of synergy amongst corporate 
practices and organizational goals. Consequently, such may result 
in what is usually referred to as the corporate governance crisis, 
especially if necessary action is not taken to address the unfolding 
corporate issues (Garratt, 2003; Nguyen, 2011).
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Corporate governance and human resource management are two 
important concepts, processes and (or) practices that are central 
to the operations of modern businesses. The recognition of the 
integral nature of both concepts aids organizations in adopting 
best practices in their corporate dealings on the one hand, whilst 
also securing the long-term interests of identifiable stakeholders 
on the other (Konzelmann et al., 2006; Graeme and Gollan, 2012). 
Corporate governance as a concept is of limited value if the 
process is confined to compliance with rules and regulations in a 
pre-determined way. The governance of organizations will usually 
entail how the board’s performance is contributing to improving 
shareholder value, whilst also making concerted efforts at forging 
good relations within the diverse stakeholder base (Garratt, 2003). 
The terminology may be described as the structured framework of 
accountability of senior management to shareholders. Corporate 
governance also entails the complete chain of formal and informal 
engagements or interactions with a matrix of stakeholders, coupled 
with their consequences for the wider society (Nerantzidis et al., 
2012). The term corporate governance differs from the concept of 
government. The latter stresses the centrality of public actors in 
defined decision making processes, whilst the former emphasizes 
the involvement of public and private interests usually referred to 
as stakeholders. It also distinct about the decision-making function 
which is not necessarily subject to a hierarchical structure of 
governance (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006).
At the center of corporate governance are key issues of board 
composition which depicts the make-up of the corporate board 
in terms of directors, independent and affiliated non-executive 
directors, and gender and age diversity and board size. Also of 
importance is the structure of the board regarding numerical 
constitution of the board; utilization of committees and delegation 
of key function to board members for a tenure. The concept entail 
matters of regulatory compliance and specifically highlights 
the essence of achieving organizational goals whilst taking due 
cognizance of compliance with relevant laws and regulations. 
Regulatory compliance is driven by the underlying policy initiative 
and non-compliance is accompanied by civil or criminal sanctions 
depending on the circumstances. Hence, compliance is limited to 
aspects of the company’s activities required by the law, regulations 
and the codes.
Furthermore, matters of corporate or operational efficiency also 
manifest in measurable respects. The emphasis being on the ratio 
between the input to run a business operation and the output derived 
from same. Inputs will usually include capital, people or effort, 
whilst outputs entail revenue and margin. The inclination toward 
gaining competitive advantages is because the level of competition 
has been elevated over the past decade and organizations have 
realized that without having specific competitive advantages they 
may not be able to remain in the market (Riasi, 2015).
2. CONCEPTUALIZING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT
Undoubtedly, there is no unanimous depiction of the term 
“corporate governance.” However, a widely shared perspective 
is that, corporate governance emphasizes issues connected with 
the overall direction, control and accountability of an organization 
corporations and society’s conception of the scope of corporate 
accountability (Cornforth, 2014). In a more specific sense, the 
concept entails appropriate board structures, processes and 
values to cope with the evolving shareholder and stakeholder 
expectations (Garratt, 2003). Arguably, the essence of corporate 
governance captures how organizations ought to be managed in 
diverse, but specific respects taking due cognizance of the certain 
internal and external issues in the operating environment. It also 
focuses on issues of ownership and control, particularly as it 
affects the internal framework and operations of the enterprise. 
In effect, good organizational governance is the ultimate 
consequence of integrating the demands of different classes of 
shareholders and stakeholders. These identifiable interests have 
over time been noted to have varying capabilities of shaping 
corporate action through social legislation and amongst other 
established channels.
Debates on corporate governance have largely been associated 
with the shareholder theory which has generated rich material and 
data for researchers (Alberto and Mirella, 2007). The Anglo-Saxon 
system of corporate governance is based on the shareholder ship 
model which emphasizes the need to preserve or maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth because shareholders are the owners of the 
organization. On the other hand, the German system of corporate 
governance centers on the principle of stakeholder ship which 
entails the process of protecting the stakeholders’ needs as they 
contribute to the success of the organization (Keasey et al., 1997). 
Emerging trends reveal that many countries have developed their 
own corporate governance codes (Nwanji and Howell, 2004). This 
pattern is particularly apparent in the private sector, where several 
companies have adapted and periodically published varying 
corporate governance code policies. It is noteworthy that certain 
aspects of the codes are consistent, as certain areas of divergence 
are also evident.
Human resource is at the center of corporate governance, as it is 
impossible to achieve the tenets of corporate governance without 
the integral contributions of human capital. Human resource 
management in a broad sense focuses on the identification, 
training, placement, deployment, utilization and optimization 
of the organization’s most valued asset, that is, the employees 
(Armstrong, 2012). In effect, the goals of the organization and 
human resource management practices are mutually reinforcing. 
This validates a perspective that supports the integration of human 
resource management policies into an organization’s overall 
corporate strategy (Heijltes and Witteloostuijn, 2003). Hence, the 
basis of human resource management is the practical and flexible 
structure of formal systems in the organization, to engender the 
effective deployment of human abilities to realize organizational 
objectives. It also entails a comprehensive approach or system to 
achieve the delivery of complementary employment policies and 
practices as well as a deliberate and structured process to develop 
integrated human resource policies and practices. The aim of this 
is to support the attainment of the organization’s strategic goal 
(Armstrong, 2012). Organizations develop, deploy and adopt an 
aggregate of practices best suited to deliver specific objectives 
(Baron and Kreps, 1999; Laursen and Foss, 2013). However, like 
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any sustainable model, organizational processes and practices 
would typically lend itself to review, appraisal and alteration, 
depending on the strategic direction of the management.
There are notable human resource management outcomes which 
come have come to the fore and can be regarded as integral to the 
optimal management of organizations. These include; employee 
commitment, which entails the level of compliance exhibited by 
employees over a period towards the advancement of the goals of 
their organization. It can also be regarded as the degree to which 
employees are committed to their work. The level of commitment 
can thus be inferred from their feelings, attitudes and behavioral 
patterns whilst performing work related tasks.
Employee engagement can be broadly referred to as the extent to 
which employees can deploy themselves physically, cognitively 
and emotionally in their job tasks. It also specifically captures 
the extent to which employees can interact and communicate 
with other employees towards the delivery of organizational 
goal. It refers to the broad and specific patterns of interaction 
and responses to unfolding issues connected to the business 
environment. Hence, the more robust the level of engagement 
is across the organizational strata, the greater the probability of 
achieving a practical appreciation of integral challenges.
Also noteworthy is the issue of disciplinary and grievance 
procedures. This usually entails the guidelines for addressing 
the myriad of challenges which have now become unavoidable 
features of a structured working relationship. It is a necessary 
practice to effectively accommodate the views of key stakeholders 
of the organization. These processes are needed to ensure that 
corporate stakeholders are treated in consistent manner in similar 
circumstances, within the established structures. Instructive in 
this regard, are the consequential disciplinary measures that 
are attributable to an established disciplinary structure within 
an organization. The measures are usually driven by corporate 
policy and regulations which have been designed and shaped per 
industry practices, customs and existing templates or precedents 
in this regard.
The centrality of corporate governance can be assessed by 
adopting an approach that progressively emphasizes the practice 
of greater openness and accountability. That is, the extent to which 
identifiable processes are integrated or harmonized, will contribute 
in measurable respects to the achievement of the corporate goals. 
The corporate nature and structure of the entity in issue must be 
taken into consideration when discussing matters touching on 
corporate governance practices and human resource management 
outcomes (Garratt, 2003). This conceptualization makes it 
possible to identify and analyze contributions of governance to the 
operations of an organization from two broad perspectives. In the 
first sense, it has usually been measured, in terms of shareholder 
value as demonstrated in the balance sheet from year to year. 
However, the diverse stakeholder base of corporate organizations 
makes it possible to explore the effects of measurable governance 
indicators attributable to the broader corporate interests and the 
effects of same within the organization’s corporate structure 
(Monks and Minow, 2001; Garratt, 2003).
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN 
CAPITAL
The general accepted accounting principle operates on the 
premise that material or corporal resources is the company’s 
most valued asset as evidenced by the company financial reports. 
This perspective seems limited, as the cumulative investment 
in human capital tends to be relatively higher over a significant 
period. It is critical to note that, accepted accounting rules also 
assign no value to human resources. The practice largely persists 
notwithstanding that this factor production constitutes about 
three-quarters of the total resources deployed in more mature 
business climes. Hence, it is plausible to devise innovative ways 
to capture human capital on the balance sheet, to achieve a more 
holistic corporate valuation over the long term (Crawford, 2007). 
This outlook is not completely out of context, as the prevailing 
accounting system was designed in an era when a company’s 
fundamental assets were majorly physical in nature (machines, 
buildings and land or real property).
However, there is a notable shift in the contemporary corporate 
climate, as there is now more emphasis on knowledge capital which 
includes assets such as, patents and brands (intellectual property 
rights) as well as research and development. It is more profitable 
in the long run for organizations to gain a broader appreciation of 
the key aspects of the corporate governance process. This process 
entails looking beyond the figures, and focusing more on the views 
and opinions of the human actors about the methods or practices 
that underpin the wealth creation goals of the corporate entity 
(Monks and Minow, 2001).
4. EMPLOYEES’ ROLE IN SHAPING 
CORPORATE POLICIES AND DIRECTION
The well established and conventional view is that strategic 
decisions and policies of organizations are determined by the board 
of directors. This outlook somewhat limits a broader appreciation 
of the process of shaping and ensuring the realization of corporate 
policies. Whilst not negating the status of the substantive board 
within the corporate structure, it is important to conceive the 
board’s functions or roles from a broader organizational stakeholder 
perspective. Legal scholars, economists and management theorists 
have opined that vesting more authority and ownership interest 
to employees contributes to long-term sustainability. In similar 
respects, it has been expressed that employment tends to forge 
a sense of ownership (Singer, 1988). This further brings to 
the light agency cost issues or the shared burden borne by the 
company, especially in the light of the underlying choices facing 
the employee i.e. maximizing the company’s gains or advancing 
his own interests.
On the part of the organization, the idea of trust alone is necessary, 
but not sufficient. This should be construed with other components 
(involvement, ownership, information and authority) of a 
system which make this approach possible and by implication, 
contributes to minimizing agency costs (Monks and Minow, 
2001). This outlook further validates the need to explore the views 
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of the participants that ensure the achievement of the strategic 
decisions formulated by the organization’s board of directors. 
Moreover, the rate of return, relative to the delivery of the set 
goals, will determine the continued relevance of the organization’s 
governance processes and practices.
There are sentiments in support of the notion that suppliers 
of labor are entitled to some measure of economic dividends 
linked to the corporate entity (Greenwood, 2008). Thus, there is 
a need to aggregate and optimize human and material resources 
in organizations with diverse processes geared towards delivery 
of increased performance. This perspective represents the 
primary goal of typical modern organizations as evidenced by 
the application of different models and strategies to achieve this 
desirable outcome. In effect, it stands to reason that the contributors 
of labor, who create value and account for organizational 
performance, should assume more prominence relative to issues 
of corporate direction.
5. OPTIMIZING THE ROLE OF EMPLOYEES 
IN THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
In the Anglo-American perspective, models relating to corporate 
ownership and control have evolved in ways that further validate 
the historical, conventional and foundational methods of 
organizational governance particularly in terms of, establishing 
the separation between matters of ownership and control (Berle 
and Means, 1932). This outlook has impacted on the ability of 
organizations to operationalize human resource management 
thereby resolving typical challenges in the sphere of production 
management (profit maximizing and cost minimizing objective). 
Thus, by assigning or positioning a dominant stakeholder group 
and allocating interests on the basis or organizational priority, 
corporate governance effectively influences the underlying 
structure, nature of stakeholder relationships as well as of enduring 
commitments that stakeholders exchange amongst themselves 
(Konzelmann et al., 2005). This approach potentially impacts 
on the willingness of individuals to engage fully in activities 
associated with a high rate of return. The central question in this 
regard, is how to create a governance structure that ensures and 
recognizes the sustainable contributions of the employees, from 
the perspective of fairness and productivity (Blair and Stout, 1999; 
Robert and Van Den Steen, 2000).
Therefore, an integral function of the corporate structure is that; 
it enables different interests to efficiently aggregate capital and 
labor for their corporate benefit. Thus, it is important that the 
process and allocation of those associated benefits become a 
fundamental issue. It has been argued that, ownership is vested 
or lies in those who have invested labor which has resulted in 
the creation of a product, and that the capitalist employer can be 
referred to as the custodian of surplus value (Alexander, 1990). 
Hence, all value is the result of the effort that has been effectively 
and efficiently allocated within an organization’s governance 
structure (Monks and Minow, 2001). The custodian of capital 
rewards the employee less than the value he produces and retains 
the surplus as profit.
6. CORPORATE LEVERAGING AND 
DECISION MAKING
It is widely accepted that a duly constituted board is engaged 
primarily with the functions of formulating and ensuring the 
implementation of strategic objectives, in addition to managing 
the risks within an organization’s corporate framework (McNulty 
et al., 2012). This outlook has further entrenched the issue of board 
composition, in discussions dealing with corporate governance 
and board performance. However, certain issues come to the fore, 
especially as it is not the board members that are responsible for 
routine operations of the company. It is necessary to consider 
certain fundamental questions to achieve a fuller appreciation of 
the corporate process. These include; identifying the decisions 
to be made; the appropriate person to implement the decisions 
and ensuring that such person is duly authorized to execute the 
decisions.
In the long-run, employees are best positioned to shape 
numerous components of the governance process owing largely 
to their access to a broader information spectrum. This class of 
stakeholders also have a minimal conflict of interest posture, 
relative to the ownership and control of the corporate entity. It 
is also instructive to note that, no class of persons apart from 
employees has a longer-term commitment to the company’s 
long-term vitality or sustainability. In terms of aggregating and 
allocating externalities, employees account for the lowest agency 
costs or conflict of interest indices. This outlook is also relevant 
to the macro-perspective and is consistent with the basis for 
establishing the corporate structure (Monks and Minow, 2001).
The Figure 1 represents a conceptual model of the corporate 
governance practices and human resource management outcomes 
as discussed. Hence, the model is generally applicable to 
identifiable actors within a structured organization seeking to 
optimize its corporate processes and human resources within a 
business context.
7. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE THEORIES
There is a relative lack of consensus on governance systems based 
on law and regulations in several developing contexts. Thus, in 
climes where such systems exist, issues of compliance and due 
enforcement are militating against the intended outcomes of the 
different governance structures and models as may be adopted. 
To varying degrees, public and private sector business concerns 
are impaired with mismanagement and regulatory inconsistencies. 
This viewpoint is evidenced by the identifiable corporate failures 
cutting across various sectors on the domestic and international 
spheres (Nguyen, 2011). Hence, selected theories are discussed 
below. The overview provides general but critical insights into the 
application of selected corporate management theories.
7.1. Stakeholder Theory
The stakeholder approach emphasizes that a corporate body was 
created to serve multiple interests or stakeholders who have a 
legitimate stake in the organization’s performance or output. 
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Mercer (1999) describes stakeholders as, every participant or 
agent for whom the firm’s development, well-being, sustainability 
is of central issue and of principal consideration. Freeman (1984) 
on the other hand, adopts a broader perspective of stakeholders 
as any classification of persons or individuals that can shape or 
be re-shaped by the achievement of a company’s objectives. The 
various perspectives in support of this theory are rooted in the 
Kantian Theories on moral duties and rights of the individual 
(Sayre-McCord, 2000). The notion of categorical imperative, 
which is an aspect of Kant’s theory of morals are applicable to 
some of the diverse stakeholders and cutting across the various 
sectors. The normative claim, that is, the idea that stakeholders 
have intrinsic moral rights in relation to the management of 
corporations (private and public) is primarily derived from 
Kant’s non-consequentialist or deontological ethical theory. 
However, in practical terms, this claim to stakeholder rights is 
based on negotiations, agreements, engagements, compliance on 
multiple levels amongst the identifiable parties. In other words, 
value, wealth, and just rewards are captured within measurable 
parameters and taking into cognizance the dynamics of a given 
context.
7.2. Principal-agency Theory
In terms of theory formulation and development, extensive 
research effort can be linked to this perspective on corporate 
management (Hart, 1995). This well-established perspective 
has made undeniable contributions towards the advancement 
of organizational research in general as well as in construing 
corporate governance issues (Jensen, 1993; Dalton et al., 2003). 
The primary essence of this theory lies in the regulation managerial 
conduct to reconcile inconsistencies with the shareholders’ wealth 
maximization principle. Thus, separating ownership from the 
dimension of control is sacrosanct, whilst ensuring that managers 
are not distracted from performing their profit-maximization role. 
In furtherance of this primary corporate objective, shareholders 
can deploy various management tools; including innovative board 
monitoring and mutual monitoring by managers (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Rediker and Seth, 1995) and inclusive of exercise of due 
diligence by large external shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Holderness and Sheehan, 1988).
Furthermore, other internal governance options entail diverse 
equity-based managerial incentives that effectively reconcile 
interest of the primary actors represented in an agency relationship 
(Murphy, 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). There are also external 
factors, such as the risk of corporate re-organizations and re-
arrangements, commonly referred to as mergers and takeovers 
(Grossman and Hart, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) competition 
relating to the product (Hart, 1983; Jensen, 1993) and the due 
regulation of labor markets may mitigate managerial abuse. 
Rediker and Seth (1995) further opined that a synergy of internal 
and external governance processes may lower principal-agent 
costs and effectively integrate interests of principals and agents. 
In the light of the broader stakeholder matrix now attributable to 
the corporate entity, employees can also be construed as an integral 
to shaping corporate direction.
7.3. Human Capital Theory
The theory emphasizes the indicators of education and training 
as a source of capital; that is continuous learning, knowledge 
and capacity building. Psacharoplos and Woodhall (1997) 
acknowledged high investment in human development as a key 
explanation for the rapid development in Asian countries. This 
perspective has been further validated by the measurable growth 
achieved in these socio-economic contexts without the benefits 
attributable to some oil dependent economies. Also, the theory 
essentially challenges the view that training and development 
are costs that organizations should strive to minimize. Instead, it 
advances the perspective, that such indicators should be construed 
as returnable investments.
It is not unusual that the theories captured above focus on 
different aspects related to the governance as well as the human 
resource management aspects of an organization. In effect, the 
theories are by no means exhaustive in capturing the diversity 
or peculiarities of evolving business models, structures and 
processes. Therefore, it should be constantly noted that the objects 
and operating environment of an organization differ to varying 
extents. This reality may manifest in the variations in emphasis 
placed on specific dimensions of the governance process. Hence, 
the contextual question remains a recurring decimal that lends 
Figure 1: Conceptual model of corporate governance practices and human resource management outcomes
Source: Oyewunmi (2016)
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itself to further appraisal, irrespective of the theory or perspective 
under consideration.
8. INTROSPECTION ON EMERGING ISSUES
Theories are relevant for consideration in order establish a basis 
for improving corporate governance practices and the connected 
human resource management issues. It has been widely deliberated 
that the weak application of corporate governance in various 
respects, has contributed to numerous corporate failures (Jensen, 
2001; Monks and Minow, 2004). This assessment is applicable 
to the incidents associated with the notable and the not well 
established business entities, operating either in the local and 
international spheres. The above commentary is also relevant 
to developed, growing, emerging and developing economies 
respectively, especially in jurisdictions where incidence of 
corruption and poor regulatory compliance is very evident or 
significant. Without a doubt, such negative elements or indicators 
will impair the performance, structures and processes of corporate 
entities operating within such environments.
Also, significant in this regard, is the escalating loss of public 
trust in the governance of corporate entities (private and public); 
particularly about the relevant authorities that are vested with the 
responsibility of implementing the regulatory processes. From a 
general view point, two broad purposes motivate the corporate 
governance thought pattern and evolution. In the first instance, 
there is an underlying need to secure stricter accountability 
of board members and individual directors to the owners or 
shareholders. Secondly, it is to mitigate the increasing fraudulent 
tendencies in several companies. An effective appreciation and 
resolution of such matters in the affected countries will further 
highlight the essence of rule of law, mitigate unethical business 
practices and thus facilitate a more liberal and flexible process 
towards the desired goal of a more global civil society.
The previous studies have therefore expended considerable effort 
on expounding the agency arrangement as well as the various types 
of ownership models attributable to the modern corporate entity 
(Edwards and Hubbard, 2005), financial disclosure (Botosan, 
2005), devices or models of compensating board members (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990; O’Connor et al., 2006), audit committees 
and board structures (MacAvoy and Millstein, 2004; Monks and 
Minow, 2004). These rules based and compliance centric models 
constitute the available channels to further bring to the light 
fundamental issues of disclosure, access to information, enhanced 
communication flow, legitimization, participation and corporate 
monitoring (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2005).
A regulatory option is prescriptive in approach and would typically 
entail proffering solutions to situations after the crisis has occurred. 
This approach, places due emphasis on various issues that ought 
to have been taken into cognizance while setting up an effective 
governance model. Such an approach is important for purposes of 
determining the option best suited to varying operating contexts. 
This contrasts with behavioral and decision-making approaches 
that focus on questions touching on effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms; actions of boards and managers. A combination of 
both approaches is better suited to accommodate the complexities 
and evolution usually associated with corporate organizations.
9. CONCLUSIONS
The introspection into corporate governance as well as human 
resource management issues is a fundamental aspect of modern 
management and the long-term relevance is evident. This view 
point is largely connected to the various corporate meltdowns, 
fraudulent and unethical practices coupled with the consequential 
criminal investigations being experienced in the corporate arena. 
It is against this backdrop, that there have been suggestions for 
new theories, models, and sector specific policy re-engineering, 
as avenues to optimize wealth creation and the human capabilities 
within a given context (Daily et al., 2003; Oyewunmi and 
Olujobi, 2016). In both developed and developing climes, notable 
evidences of defective corporate governance processes have been 
documented, pertaining to activities spanning across diverse 
sectors. Moreover, the collateral damage to the human resource 
component can by no means be relegated, being the life blood of 
the corporate entity.
Organizations operating within the broad financial sector have 
been widely investigated in comparison to other sectors. Thus, 
there are limited empirical studies that capture the complete scale 
of reasons contributing to the crises associated with corporations. 
The existing research generally tends to emphasize the issues 
of regulation and control connected with accounting and legal 
mechanisms. Therefore, the research is limited on contextual 
issues and wider global perspectives. The admixture of approaches 
is a testimony to the multifaceted dimension of the corporate 
governance debate and reinforces the argument in this paper for 
a more integrative perspective of the issue.
This paper recommends the adoption of transitional models of 
corporate governance that incorporate broader issues, cutting 
across legal, regulatory, social-science and management 
perspectives. The renewed outlook will further explain the 
dynamics surrounding the governance of corporate entities. It 
will contribute to development of practical models that will help 
to mitigate corporate failures, whilst considering the connected 
human resource management outcomes. That is, the greater the 
synergy within identifiable aspects of a structured corporate entity, 
the more evident the opportunities to achieve measurable growth. 
In effect, such a practice provides a reasonable platform for 
corporate evolution particularly in the dynamic business climate.
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